群体诉讼的博弈分析
王福华群体诉讼的博弈分析
The Game Analysis of Collective Litigation
期刊名称：《法学研究》
期刊年份：
作者：王福华
单位：
中文关键词：群体诉讼;诉讼博弈;诉讼和解;胜诉取酬
英文关键词：collective litigation; litigation game; settlement of litigation; contingent fee
中文摘要：
对群体诉讼展开博弈分析，能为制度完善及程序优化提供微观经济学和社会心理学依据。群体诉讼博弈主要在群体内部、群体诉讼原被告之间、群体与法院之间、群体与代理律师之间展开，每一类博弈中的主体都有特定的诉讼策略及诉讼收益。一般而言，博弈双方在程序选择和实体处分决策上能够实现博弈均衡，找到满足各方利益的折中策略。在群体形成的各种博弈中，抑制“搭便车”策略、采纳“选择退出”规则以及采取措施激励高额受害者，有利于维系和巩固群体并实现群体诉讼制度价值。群体原告与被告之间的博弈中，有关起诉、应诉的策略选择反映了协调当事人诉讼预期和促进诉讼合作的必要性；群体原告与被告的诉讼和解博弈则揭示出诉讼成本、程序运作的准确性对诉讼和解的影响，以及法院协调和监督诉讼和解的必要性。群体诉讼案件管理的博弈活动表明，法院受理群体诉讼案件应得到合理激励；律师胜诉取酬博弈则应被合理规制，以防止制度滥用。
英文摘要：
The game analysis of collective litigation can provide the basis of microeconomics and social psychology for the improvement of the collective litigation system. The game in collective litigation is mainly carried out between class members, the class plaintiff and the defendant, the class and the court, as well as the class and the attorney, in each of them the players have specific litigation strategies and benefits. Generally speaking, the two sides of the game can achieve game equilibrium in procedural choice and substantial disposition decision, and find a compromised strategy to satisfy the interests of all players. In various kinds of game in collective litigation, restraining the "free-rider" strategy, adopting the "opt-out" rule, and incentivizing the high-value victims are conducive to maintaining and consolidating the group and realizing the value of collective litigation. In the game between the class plaintiff and the defendant, the choice of tactics of instituting and responding to an action reflects the necessity of coordinating the litigation expectations of parties and promoting litigation cooperation. The settlement game between class plaintiff and the defendant reveals the influence of the litigation cost and the accuracy of procedural operation on the settlement, and the need for the court to coordinate and supervise the settlement of the action. The game of case management in collective litigation shows that the court should be reasonably incentivized to accept class action, and the game of contingent fee needs to be reasonably regulated to prevent the abuse of collective litigation.
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