省级统管地方法院法官任用改革审思———基于实证考察的分析
左卫民省级统管地方法院法官任用改革审思———基于实证考察的分析
Reflections on the System of Unified Control by Provincial Court over the Appointment of Judges in District Courts
期刊名称：《法学研究》
期刊年份：
作者：左卫民
单位：四川大学法学院
中文关键词：地方法院;法官任用;省级统管
英文关键词：district court;appointment of judges;unified control by provincial courts
中文摘要：
对于地方法院法官的任用,实践中已经发展出一套独特的机制:绝大部分法官任用的实质性决策权主要由法院内部及本级党组掌握,法院外部的权力主体及上级法院仅参与法院领导的任用;任用标准表现为以职业化为主,兼顾领导管理能力;任用程序上则形成多元化、有限竞争的选任格局.从效果层面分析,这套机制具有相当的经济性,通常能够选拔出具有一定业务能力和领导管理能力的法官及法院领导,但其存在的问题也较为明显.这套机制的形成主要与中国整体的干部任用制度以及司法制度建设、改革的进程有关.整体上看,目前着手推进的省级统管地方法院法官任用的改革,会在一定程度上解决以往地方法院法官、院长任用过程中可能存在的“地方主义”甚至“山头主义”、“保护主义”等问题,但也可能存在信息收集能力较差、任用成本过高等不足.“有限集中,分层授权”是既可解决上述问题,又能兼顾地方法院法官任用机制改革基本出发点的有效改革方略.
英文摘要：
In practice, China has developed a unique institutional mechanism for the appointment of judges in district courts. The substantive decision-making power over the appointment of vast majority of judges is controlled by the internal court and Party leadership group at the same level, while the authorities outside the court and higher-level courts are only involved in the appointment of court's leadership. The appointment standards mainly focus on professionalism, but also include leadership ability. With respect to the appointment procedure, a diversified and limited competitive appointment pattern has been developed. From the perspective of effects, this appointment mechanism is fairly economic and usually able to select the judges and court leaders with certain professional and leadership capacities. However, it also has relatively obvious problems. The formation of this institutional mechanism is primarily related to the holistic cadre appointment system and the process of judicial construction in China. Viewed as a whole, the current reform of provincial court's unified control over the appointment of judges in district courts is able to solve to a certain extent the problems of “localism” or even “mountain-stronghold mentality” and “protectionism” in the appointment of judges (presidents) of district courts, but may have the deficiencies of relatively low information-gathering capability and high appointment cost. “Limited centralization and hierarchical authorization” is an effective reform strategy that can both solve the above problems and give consideration to the basic starting point of the reform of the mechanism for the appointment of judges in district courts.
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