“对赌协议”的裁判路径及政策选择——基于PE/VC与公司对赌场景的分析
刘燕“对赌协议”的裁判路径及政策选择——基于PE/VC与公司对赌场景的分析
Judicial Paths and Policy Choices on Value Adjustment Mechanism Disputes
期刊名称：《法学研究》
期刊年份：
作者：刘燕
单位：北京大学法学院
中文关键词：“对赌协议”;履行障碍;资本维持原则;清偿能力限制;司法商业判断
英文关键词：value adjustment mechanism; legal obstacle to the operation of VAM; capital maintenance; insolvency test; judicial business judgment
中文摘要：
PE/VC与目标公司对赌的司法裁判要点从合同效力转入合同可履行性后，需要面对两个层次的追问：一是以什么样的实体标准来判断履行障碍，二是由谁来判断是否存在履行障碍。华工案和"九民纪要"仅处理了第一个层次的问题，且主要以资本维持原则作为实体判断标准。然而，我国现行公司法资本维持原则过于粗疏，且缺乏"大分配"概念和底线规制的思路，导致"对赌协议"下的回购只能通过减资的途径，徒增成本。域外以清偿能力标准替代资本维持原则，体现了另一种以债权人利益为导向限制公司资产单向流出至股东的规制思路，但其商业逻辑上的合理性却无法掩盖更大的操作成本。就第二层次的判断主体而言，以美国特拉华州为代表，法官的商业判断逐渐让位于公司董事会的商业判断，却进一步凸显了公司、不同类别股东、债权人之间利益冲突的复杂状态。立法层面的价值判断与政策选择将最终决定司法裁判的走向，未来我国公司法的修订需要回应商业实践的诉求，同时PE/VC投资者也需要直面投资失败的风险承担。
英文摘要：
After Chinese courts shifted their focus from the issue of legal validity to that of enforceability of VAM contracts in VAM cases concerning venture capital and its portfolio companies, they are facing two further inquiries. Firstly, what kind of substantive standard can be applied to judge the legal obstacles to the fulfilment of obligation by the portfolio company under VAM? Secondly, who is the proper subject to make this judgment? Both the Huagong Case and the Minutes of the National Courts' Civil and Commercial Trial Work Conference only deal with the first inquiry, and apply the principle of capital maintenance to VAM disputes as the main standard. The current practice of capital maintenance doctrine in China, however, is very crude, without such overall definition as "large distribution" or the idea of bottom line regulation that are common in many other countries. This results in the fact that the portfolio company requiring redemption under VAM has no way but operate a costly and burdensome procedure of capital reduction. Alternatively, the insolvency test in many modernized company laws is used to replace the traditional capital maintenance doctrine, carrying out the same task of restricting the outflow of company assets to shareholders in order to protect the interests of creditors, although the insolvency test operates with higher cost and greater uncertainty. As for the second inquiry, Delaware Court, as a pioneer and most influential court in this area, has shifted from judicial business judgment to corporate business judgment while further highlight the complex conflict of interest among the company, different types of shareholders and creditors. In this regard, the value balancing and policy choice on the legislative level will ultimately determine the direction of judicial development. The upcoming revision of Chinese Company Law should respond to the demands of business practice. Meanwhile venture capital has to undertake the risk of investment failure.
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