关联交易规制的世行范式评析与中国范式重构
汪青松关联交易规制的世行范式评析与中国范式重构
Regulation of Affiliated Transactions: World Bank's Paradigm and Reconstruction of the Chinese Paradigm
期刊名称：《法学研究》
期刊年份：
作者：汪青松
单位：重庆市人文社科重点研究基地“市场交易法律制度研究基地”、西南政法大学民商法学院
中文关键词：营商环境 投资者保护 关联交易 公司集团 公共执法
英文关键词：business environment; protecting investors; affiliated transactions; corporate group; public law enforcement
中文摘要：
世行营商环境评估中的“保护少数投资者”指标以各经济体规制上市公司关联交易的纸面规则作为评估基础，其案例假设中隐含着公司形态独立性、关联交易损害性、严格规制良法性和私人执法主导性等前提假定。该指标设定构成了带有自身价值倾向的“世行关联交易规制范式”，其内在逻辑缺陷可归纳为：简单的案例假设与市场客观情境相去甚远，对于关联交易的结构与功能认知有失偏颇，规制方法忽略了不同法律手段之间的整体协同以及评估结果不能反映法律运行实践及其规制效果。以世行范式为参照，能够发现中国现行相关立法存在相似的视角局限和制度缺陷。回应中国市场情境与现实需求的制度变革需要从基于独立法人的行为规制范式转向基于公司集团的结构与行为并重的规制范式。重构的基本思路应当以行为法和组织法的相互协调为基础，着重发挥利益平衡的规制功能，在法律机制上注重事前批准、事中披露与事后救济的多措并举，在实施保障上做到公共执法与私人执法并重。
英文摘要：
The indicator of “protecting minority investors” in the World Bank Doing Business Report is based on the textual regulation of affiliated transactions of listed corporations in every economy entity. Its case hypothesis contains such presuppositions as independence of corporate form, harmfulness of affiliated transactions, stricter regulation of the better law and dominance of private law enforcement. The indicator constitutes a “World Bank paradigm of the regulation of affiliated transaction” with its own value tendency. However, its simple case hypothesis is far from being able to reflect the objective market situation, its understanding on the structure and function of affiliated transactions is biased, its regulatory method ignores the overall coordination among different legal means, and its evaluation results can not reflect the legal operational practice and regulatory effect. Drawing lessons from the World Bank paradigm, we can find the same limitation of perspective and institutional deficiencies in the current Chinese legislation. In response to the development of market situation and practical needs, China should transform its affiliated transaction regulation paradigm from the current behavioral regulation paradigm, which is based on the independent company perspective, to the structural and behavioral regulation paradigm, which is based on the corporate group perspective. In the reconstruction of the paradigm, China should take the coordination between behavior law and organization law as the basis, focus on the regulatory function of the balancing of interests, promote multiple legal mechanisms simultaneously, and pay equivalent attention on public and private law enforcement.
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