公司机会规则的反思与体系建构
袁崇霖公司机会规则的反思与体系建构
Reflections on and Systematic Construction of Corporate Opportunity Doctrine
期刊名称：《法学研究》
期刊年份：
作者：袁崇霖
单位：
中文关键词：公司机会;公司利益;忠实义务;识别规则;抗辩规则
英文关键词：corporate opportunity; corporate interest; duty of loyalty; characterization test; defense rule
中文摘要：
作为属于公司的商业机会，公司机会的本质并非公司财产，而应当理解为公司利益。公司机会规则具有阶段性的利益构造，其所规制的利益冲突也具有动态变化的特征。有必要以公司是否实际投入人力、物力资源为标准，区分公司机会的发现阶段和利用阶段，并配置差异化的规则。在发现阶段，应推定公司经营范围内的商业机会属于公司，董事在充分履行披露义务的基础上，可援引公司放弃、公司同意、公司不能、交易对手事前拒绝等抗辩事由而自行利用。在利用阶段，商业机会已经认定为归属公司，董事非经完全披露并取得公司同意不得利用。通过宽严适当的识别与抗辩规则，配合推定规则和披露义务等，可构建起层次性的两阶段公司机会规则体系。
英文摘要：
According to the corporate opportunity doctrine, it is corporate interest, rather than the claim of corporate property, that decides whether a business opportunity belongs to a corporation. Corporate interest begins to accumulate when the corporation undertakes an opportunity, the process of which can be divided into two stages, i.e., the discovering stage and the implementation stage. Throughout the process, the corporation may lose its interest in the opportunity as situations change and it is allowable for a director to exploit the opportunity when the corresponding conflict of interest vanishes. The optimum rules should reflect the variations. The discovering stage is the phase where the corporation has not invested any soft or hard resources into the opportunity, for which less strict rules should apply. At this stage, an opportunity within the line of business is presumed to belong to the corporation. After offering the opportunity to the corporation with necessary disclosure, a director may take advantage of the opportunity if he gets approval of the corporation, or the opportunity has been rejected by the corporation, or the corporation is unable to utilize the opportunity, or the counterparty is unwilling to deal with the corporation beforehand. At the implementation stage, corporate interest in the opportunity becomes realistic due to the corporation's investment, which makes strict and prophylactic rules essential. The director may pursue the opportunity only after full disclosure and receiving the corporation's approval. This set of two-stage rules that include flexible characterization test and differentiated defenses would provide a desirable framework for the transplantation of corporate opportunity doctrine into Chinese corporate law.
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