裁判可接受性概念之反省
陈景辉裁判可接受性概念之反省
Re-examination of the Concept of Judicial Acceptability
期刊名称：《法学研究》
期刊年份：
作者：陈景辉
单位：中国政法大学法理学研究所
中文关键词：裁判可接受性;公众意见;正当化理由;司法民主化
英文关键词：judicial acceptability;public opinion;justifying reason;judicial democracy
中文摘要：
以“公众意见能够取代法律标准”为核心的裁判可接受性概念，实际上是以下两个方面的统合：一方面，公众意见能够被转化成正当化理由，因此才能取代法律标准成为裁判依据；另一方面，司法民主化要求司法裁判必须反映公众意见。但是这两个要素都存在明显的缺陷：第一，公众意见难以转化为规范性的正当化理由；第二，司法民主化可以分为直接民主化与间接民主化，并且间接民主化能够更好地与现行民主制度、裁判者的司法义务等要素保持一致，但是裁判可接受性概念中的民主化只是直接民主化的体现。由于以上两个方面的问题，裁判可接受性概念缺乏存在的恰当基础。
英文摘要：
This article focuses on the criticism of the concept of judicial acceptability whose central issue is that judges can use public opinions to displace the legal standards in legal reasoning. This concept has two factors. Firstly, the public opinions, like legal standards, are justifying reasons, so that they could be the ground of judicial decision-making. Secondly, to pursue the value of judicial democracy, public opinions must be reflected in the judicial process. However, through careful re-examination of those factors, both are implausible.Due to the following two aspects, judicial acceptability is a concept without foundations. On the one hand, public opinions could not be converted to justifying reasons. In legal reasoning, judges must give arguments to support the decisions that they render. Those arguments are reasons for the decisions. Judges could give two kinds of reasons: justifying reasons and explanatory reasons. The former aims to justify the decisions, and the latter aims to explain why those decisions occurred. Therefore, the explanatory reasons have no ability to justify the decisions. Undoubtedly, because the nature of public opinions is not necessary “(moral) good” and they are indeterminate, public opinions are the explanatory reasons of decisions, not justifying ones. So judges could not take those opinions as justification for the decisions in legal reasoning.On the other hand, democracy is the fundamental political principle in modern society, so the judicial democracy becomes the fundamental principle of legal reasoning. There are two kinds of judicial democracy: directly judicial democracy and indirectly judicial democracy. The supporters of the concept of judicial acceptability think that using public opinions in legal reasoning will match the requirement of judicial democracy. But in fact, judicial acceptability only matches the directly judicial democracy. More over, the indirectly judicial democracy could correspond with the core of modern political democracy, Majority Votes, and judicial duty of judges better. Therefore, judicial democracy cannot become the foundation of judicial acceptability either.
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