侵权法中权利与利益的区分方法
于飞侵权法中权利与利益的区分方法
Method to Distinguish between Right and Interestin Tort Law
期刊名称：《法学研究》
期刊年份：
作者：于飞
单位：中国政法大学
中文关键词：侵权法;权利;利益;法教义学;法政策
英文关键词：tort law;right;interest;legal doctrine;legal policy
中文摘要：
我国理论和实务界虽有不少在侵权法中建立权益区分保护体系的建议，但缺少对如何区分侵权法上的权利和利益的深入研究。德国民法学对侵权法上的权益区分提出了“归属效能”、“排除效能”和“社会典型公开性”三个教义学标准。归属效能的核心在于将确定的利益内容归属于特定主体；排除效能的核心在于主体得排除他人的一切非法干涉；社会典型公开性的核心在于使社会一般主体有识别利益客体的可能性，从而兼顾潜在加害人的行为自由。同时符合这三个标准的，为侵权法上的权利；反之即为利益。在受害人权益保护成为侵权法优先价值的背景下，以上法教义学标准遇到了理论与实践上的障碍，应从法政策视角弥补法教义学解释力之不足。
英文摘要：
Chinese legal theorists and practitioners have some suggestions for the establishment of a system that distinguishes between the protection of rights and the protection of interests, but the Chinese legal field still lacks in-depth research on how to distinguish between rights and interests in the tort law. The existing discussion only argues for the necessity of such distinction, but there has been few discussion of how such distinction could be feasibly implemented, so the current theories have little power. The German civil law offers three legal criteria for the distinction between rights and interests. Rights in the tort law should have the “allocation function”, the “exclusion function” and the “typical social obviousness”. The core of the “allocation function” is to assign a certain interest to a certain subject, while the center of the “exclusion function” is to exclude all the unlawful interference from others. Moreover, the “typical social obviousness” is to make general subjects have the general possibility of identifying the objects of interest, thus takes into account the freedom to act of the potential infringers. Those which satisfy the three criteria concurrently are rights in tort law, otherwise they are interests. With tort law weighted towards protecting the rights and interests of the victim, the judges begin to tend to interpret some interests (pure economical interests) as rights, where the claimants are few in number and clearly defined, so as to produce more and convenient bases for claims. This has blurred in some instances the three doctrinal criteria discussed above. At this point, we should apply the perspective of legal policy to remedy and bolster the explanatory power of legal doctrine.
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