论“数字人权”不构成第四代人权

论“数字人权”不构成第四代人权

“Digital Human Rights” Do Not Constitute the Fourth Generationof Human Rights

    期刊名称：《法学研究》
    期刊年份：
    作者：刘志强
    单位：广州大学人权研究院
    中文关键词：数字人权;第四代人权;道德人权;基本权利
    英文关键词：digital human rights; the fourth generation of human rights; moral rights; fundamental rights
    中文摘要：
    从人权的代际划分原理来看，“数字人权”的概念即使成立，也只属于三代人权范畴的内容，可以在既有人权体系的框架内得到合理解释，没有突破既有的三代人权格局；个人数据信息类权利的出现，未构成人权的代际革新。从人权的道德属性来看，“数字人权”不具备人权的道德基础，难以通过“数字人性”来实现道德人权层面的证成，也就无法成为一项基本人权。从基本权利理论来看，“数字人权”既缺乏宪法的规范基础，也不符合“人的尊严”标准和“最低限度基础性”标准，无法被证立为宪法未列举基本权利。总之，“数字人权”不仅不是新一代人权，甚至不宜作为人权的下位概念。
    英文摘要：
    From the perspective of the principle of intergenerational division, “digital human rights” are an increase in the number of human rights, which can be reasonably explained within the framework of the existing human rights system. They do not break through the existing three-generation pattern of human rights or constitute the intergenerational innovation of human rights. From the perspective of the moral attribute of human rights, “digital human rights” do not have the moral basis of human rights, are incapable of achieving the justification of moral human rights through “digital human nature”, and thus cannot become fundamental human rights. From the perspective of fundamental rights, “digital human rights” neither have the normative basis of the constitution, nor meet the “human dignity” standard or “minimum standard” and, as a result, cannot be justified as fundamental rights not listed in the constitution. Therefore, “digital human rights” are not a new type of human rights that can be upgraded to the fourth generation of human rights and, indeed, do not even constitute human rights.
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