破产法的指标化进路及其检讨——以世界银行“办理破产”指标为例
高丝敏破产法的指标化进路及其检讨——以世界银行“办理破产”指标为例
Critique of the Indicatorization of Insolvency Law
期刊名称：《法学研究》
期刊年份：
作者：高丝敏
单位：
中文关键词：计量比较法;营商环境;办理破产指标;破产融资;债权人保护
英文关键词：quantitative comparative law; Doing Business; Resolving Insolvency Indicators (RII); new financing in insolvency; creditor protection
中文摘要：
世界银行营商环境指标弥补了比较法研究中缺少明确度量性的“黑箱难题”，但存在法律渊源的偏见以及衡量工具的缺陷，并且追求整齐划一的最佳规则可能引发监管的道德风险。世界银行“办理破产”指标存在评估程序和评估债权选择上的缺陷，评估方式无法真正反映回收率以及对营运价值的理解偏差，且忽视了破产规则本身的体系性及其背后的价值。对标世行指标而制定的我国“破产法解释三”的新融资制度遗漏了关于新融资的重要限定条件，缺少关于权益“受调整或影响”的界定，债权人信息获取权制度存在理念偏差。获得满分的待履行合同制度和债权人最佳利益标准等由于现有规则的漏洞和错位而无法有效回应实践需要。破产法效率的衡量指标应当侧重评估破产企业控制权和资产的优化配置以及破产前后投资的预期收益保护这两个制度目标的实现程度，如保证破产程序中集体决议的效率和底线公平，并在管理人、债权人会议和法院之间合理分配新融资的决定权。
英文摘要：
Although the World Bank Group’s Doing Business Indicators (DBIs) can make up for the shortcoming of “black box problem” in comparative law caused by the lack of clear metrics, it is biased in legal origins and flawed in measurement, and its pursuit of uniform best rules may lead to regulatory moral hazard. The World Bank’s Resolving Insolvency Indicators (RII) also has such problems as flaws in procedures and objects of assessment, defects in measurement methods which can’t truly reflect the recovery rate, and misunderstandings on going concern value of reorganization regime. In China, the new financing rule, the voting rule of impaired parties, the rule on information accessibility for creditors and other rules set forth in the Judicial Interpretation III of Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, which benchmarks the RII, are imperfect and still need some improvements. The existing rules of executive contract and of best interests of creditors, which got the full scores by RII, fail to respond effectively to the demands of practice due to some defects. Indicators of the efficiency of bankruptcy law should focus on assessing the fulfillment of two objects, namely the optimal allocation of control and assets of the insolvent firms and the protection of the expected return on investment before and after firms’ bankruptcy, such as ensuring the efficiency and bottom-line fairness of collective resolutions in insolvency proceedings, and rationally allocating the decision-making power of new financing among the trustees, creditors’ meetings and the court.
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